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BEHIND THE GUISE OF GANG
MEMBERSHIP: ENDING THE UNJUST
CRIMINALIZATION
KATHRYN KiZER*
"The violence comes from the anger. The anger of
being poor and never having enough."'
I. INTRODUCTION
If a person is involved with a criminal street gang, lives in an
urban community, struggles to make ends meet, and is a person
of color, he is likely to face another hardship: harsher criminal-
ization because of his gang membership.2
Today, nearly every state in the United States has enacted
some sort of legislation pertaining to gangs or gang activity. 3
For example, over half of all states impose more severe penalties
* Kathryn Kizer is a member of the Class of 2012 at DePaul University Col-
lege of Law. Upon graduation, she plans to practice criminal defense in Chi-
cago. She would like to thank the 2011-2012 J4SJ Board for its support
throughout the editing process. She would especially like to thank Professor
Sumi Cho for encouraging her to write this article for her Race & Racism in
U.S. Law Seminar. Finally, she dedicates this article to all of the individuals
caught in the grasp of the criminal justice system who inspire her to fight.
1 Thugtrash, gang member, http://www.gangstyle.com/gangs-gangster-
quotes.php (last visited Oct. 28, 2011).
2 See generally Judithe Greene & Kevin Pranis, Gang Wars: The Failure of
Enforcement Tactics and the Need for Effective Public Safety Strategies, JUST.
POL'Y INST., 6-8 (July 17, 2007), available at http://www.justicepolicy.org/
uploads/justicepolicy/documents/07-07_rep-gangwars-gc-ps-ac-jj.pdf.
3 National Gang Center, "Highlights of Gang-Related Legislation," (Spring
2011), http://www.nationalgangcenter.gov/Legislation/Highlights (last visited
Oct. 11, 2011).
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for criminal activity that is gang-related. 4 Although fewer gang
members exist today than ten years ago and gang activity "ac-
count[s] for a relatively small share of crime in most jurisdic-
tions," a majority of the country has enacted these laws because
they believe the U.S. faces a "national gang 'crisis.' "5 As a re-
sult of this misperception and fear, states have waged low-level
police warfare against perceived gang members. These massive
police crackdowns on gang affiliation are not only ineffective,
they fly in the face of the realities of being a poor, young person
of color in a blighted American community.6 In response to this
national war on gangs, opponents have waged their own fight to
try to reduce the criminalization of gang membership.7
The U.S. Supreme Court has said that an individual must not
be punished because of his or her "status" under the Cruel and
Unusual Punishment Clause of the Eighth Amendment. 8 In
American society, gang membership is a status-one into which
many are socialized. 9 Therefore, to criminalize someone for his
gang membership is to violate his right to be free from cruel and
unusual punishment. These laws must be eradicated. And be-
cause the usual toolkit for fighting anti-gang laws is outdated
and ineffective, a new status-based discourse is necessary.
Although opponents of anti-gang legislation typically chal-
lenge these laws through traditional overbreadth and vagueness
4 Id.
5 Greene & Pranis, supra note 2, at 6.
6 See Thomas A. Myers, Note, The Unconstitutionality, Ineffectiveness, and
Alternatives of Gang Injunctions, 14 MICH. J. RACE & L. 285, 301 (2009)
(discussing the ineffective police suppression tactics implemented in Los
Angeles).
7 For example, in the Cook County Public Defender's office in the Chicago-
land area, a handful of Assistant Public Defenders have unsuccessfully at-
tempted to bring constitutional challenges to the Illinois gang criminalization
law, 720 ILL. COMP STAT. 5/24-1.8 (2011).
8 Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 666 (1962).
9 See Aaron B. Overton, Note, Federal Gang Laws: A New Tool Against a
Growing Threat or Overbroad and Dangerous? 9 RUTGERS RACE & L. REV.
405, 411 (2008).
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doctrines, a more effective avenue is the Eighth Amendment
status doctrine, because traditional doctrines permit the
criminalization of gang members while the status doctrine better
supports sociological realities: people of color who belong to
gangs do so because of a long history of hardship and should not
be further punished because of this status.
Street gang members targeted by anti-gang laws are typically
young men of color born into communities with few options for
economic survival, protection or role models. Thus, the
criminalization of gang members is essentially the criminaliza-
tion of poor people of color who have had to survive genera-
tions of racism and societal marginalization. This proposed
platform for challenging anti-gang legislation will therefore
demonstrate why a person should not be punished more se-
verely because of his status as a gang member.
Nearly all existing research surrounding the criminalization of
gang membership focuses on two select constitutional doctrines:
overbreadth and vagueness. 10 As a result, theorists tend to fo-
cus on why criminalizing gang membership violates a person's
First Amendment or Due Process Clause rights.11 For example,
some argue that the means used to deal with gang violence-
harsher punishment-is not effective and therefore unconstitu-
tional.12 Others claim that the freedom of association necessa-
rily entails one's right to associate with a gang and, therefore,
such legislation is unconstitutional. 13 All of these approaches in-
voke more traditional avenues of constitutional analysis. How-
ever, little to no analysis exists that takes an Eighth Amendment
approach-the ban on status-based punishment-and invokes
sociological research to argue for the eradication of legislation
that criminalizes gang membership.
10 See, e.g., Overton, supra note 9.
11 Id. at 418.
12 See, e.g., Myers, supra note 6 at 295-96.
13 Many criminal defense attorneys, for example, have suggested writing this
analysis with a focus on the right to association.
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Under the seminal case of Robinson v. California, the U.S.
Supreme Court found that it was cruel and unusual to punish an
individual solely for being a narcotics addict-a status for which
he could not fairly be criminalized. 14 There have been attempts
to expand this status doctrine to alcoholism, sexual disorders,
mental illness and homelessness. 15 However, few have been suc-
cessful in light of the dearth of U.S. Supreme Court precedent
governing this area of law. State and federal decisions across
the country amount to a conflicting web of attempted Robinson
interpretations.16 This web reflects the confusion surrounding
the intended application of Robinson. Although some attempts
have been made to apply the status doctrine to gang member-
ship, this is a largely undeveloped territory.17 Thus, with the aid
of the extensive sociological research on gangs, a ripe opportu-
nity exists to use the status doctrine to strike anti-gang laws as
unconstitutional.
This critique will first use a blend of articles, books and docu-
mentaries to explore the nature of gang membership-why peo-
ple join, why they stay and the historical forces that influence
the "decision" to join. This research will show that people of
color in poor neighborhoods who join gangs often do so because
of forces greater than themselves: a history of oppression, a lack
of opportunity for safe socialization and few prospects for up-
ward mobility.
Following the sociological discussion, this critique will ex-
amine the legal ways in which gang members are criminalized,
14 Robinson, 370 U.S. at 666.
15 See Doe v. City of Lafayette, 377 F.3d 757, 782 (7th Cir. 2004) (Williams,
dissenting); Julliette Smith, Arresting the Homeless for Sleeping in Public: A
Paradigm for Expanding the Robinson Doctrine, 29 COLUM. J.L. & Soc.
PROBS. 293 (1996).
16 See, e.g., United States v. Black, 116 F.3d 198 (7th Cir. 1997).
17 See City of Chicago v. Youkhana, 660 N.E.2d 34 (Ill. App. Ct. 1995); Tran-
script of Oral Ruling on Motion Argument, People v. Navarrete, No. 10 CR
11085 (Ill. Cir. Ct. Cook Co. July 21, 2011) (during his oral ruling, the judge
rejected a constitutionality challenge to the Illinois anti-gang law and chose
not to substantively address the defense's status argument).
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using the Illinois Unlawful Use of a Firearm by a Street Gang
Member law as an illustration. The legal discussion will transi-
tion into an analysis of the traditional platforms for contesting
the constitutionality of anti-gang laws. This will focus on the
two most common doctrines: vagueness and overbreadth. The
discussion will conclude with an explanation as to why these
traditional approaches cannot eradicate anti-gang laws.
After a survey of traditional constitutional doctrines, this cri-
tique will elucidate the less commonly known status doctrine of
the Eighth Amendment. This section will show how the U.S.
Supreme Court has established the status platform without fully
developing its meaning, which has caused confusion among
lower courts regarding its scope and application. However, this
analysis will show that if developed more coherently, the status
doctrine can protect people from harsher punishment for their
gang membership-a guise for skin color, neighborhood and so-
cioeconomic status.
Finally, this critique will propose a multidisciplinary approach
as the most persuasive way to eradicate these laws: a non-tradi-
tional, Eighth Amendment legal analysis that reflects the socio-
logical underpinnings of gang life. This section will blend legal
doctrine and sociological literature, weaving historical influ-
ences throughout the discussion. The sociological context will
reveal how the Eighth Amendment should be framed to pro-
hibit the criminalization of gang membership-a status, just like
drug addiction or chronic alcoholism.
This critique will intervene in the discussion about the consti-
tutionality of anti-gang laws by contending that (1) the tradi-
tional constitutional doctrinal approaches do not reach far
enough to render these laws unconstitutional; (2) the Eighth
Amendment status doctrine, which has been previously limited
to drug addiction, alcoholism and other illness-type conditions,
should be expanded to gang membership; and (3) a multidis-
ciplinary approach that uses both law and sociological literature
Volume 5, Number 2
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is the most effective platform for arguing that gang membership
should not be criminalized.
The disproportionate effect on young men of color, coupled
with the history of racism and socioeconomic inequalities that
have given rise to gangs, render this criminalization illegal, im-
moral and harmful to efforts of de-incarceration in the criminal
justice system. If activists are seeking to dismantle mass incar-
ceration in the U.S., laws that criminalize gang membership
must be eradicated. To accomplish this, a new theoretical ap-
proach is necessary.
II. WHAT ARE GANGS, WHY Do THEY EXIST, AND How
ARE THEY CRIMINALIZED?
A. What are gangs?
Various definitions of "gangs" are splattered across penal
codes, textbooks, scholarly works and documentaries. Whether
lawmakers view their enemy simply as a "gang" or more specifi-
cally a "criminal street gang," the targeted group is clear: organ-
ized, urban enterprises of young men who engage in criminal
activity.18 This understanding of the criminal street gang, how-
ever, is flawed.
Although legislators across the U.S. have attempted to define
gangs for purposes of statutes, ordinances and civil injunctions,
no uniform definition exists.19 Moreover, judges and lawyers
tend to hold misperceptions about street gangs; they believe
these groups are organized, hierarchical, criminally advanced
enterprises.20 Malcolm W. Klein, Director of the Social Science
Research Institute at the University of Southern California, says
18 Beth Bjerregaard, The Constitutionality of Anti-Gang Legislation, 21
CAMPBELL L. REV. 31, 32 (1998).
19 National Gang Center, Brief Review of Federal and State Definitions of the
Terms "Gang," "Gang Crime," and "Gang Member," 1-2 (Dec. 2009).
20 Malcolm W. Klein, Gangs: What Are Street Gangs When They Get to
Court?, 31 VAL. U.L. REV. 515, 518 (1997).
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this misperception is actually reflective of the more sophisti-
cated "drug gang."21 Drug gangs are often assumed to be be-
hind the street gang activity in the U.S., causing prosecutors to
equate a criminal defendant's gang affiliation with a drug gang.22
Street gangs, however, are more common, larger and more
loosely structured groups that engage in ranging degrees of
criminal activity.23 This confusion elevates the fear and per-
ceived dangerousness of street gang members when they get to
court.24 Moreover, it allows states to justify the passage of anti-
gang laws by relying on people's fears that gangs are organized,
mob-like enterprises taking over the streets.25
Although researchers have similarly failed to agree on a defi-
nition of gangs,26 they have identified predominate characteris-
tics that more closely resemble urban street gangs. According to
Klein, there are seven common characteristics:27 (1) territorial-
ity; (2) variation in criminal offenses; (3) male dominated; (4)
"[a] preponderance of racial or ethnic minority membership,
usually black or Hispanic;" (5) ages ranging, on average, be-
21 Id.
22 Id. at 517, 520.
23 See id. at 517.
24 Id. at 518, 520.
25 During a motion argument contesting the constitutionality of an Illinois
anti-gang law, Assistant State's Attorney Victoria Kennedy continually refer-
enced gang-related violence as a way of justifying the need to criminalize
gang membership. Transcript of Motion Argument at 11-12, People v. Vi-
cente Navarrete, No. 10 CR 11085 (I11. Cir. Cook Co. Ct. June 30, 2011).
Moreover, in commenting on the passage of this law, State's Attorney Anita
Alvarez stated, "This new law will be an extremely important tool for police
and prosecutors in the battle against gang and gun violence in our communi-
ties." Press Release, Governor's Office, Governor Quinn Signs Legislation
Targeting Illegal Firearm Possession by Gang Members (Dec. 3, 2009), avail-
able at http://www.illinois.gov/PressReleases/ShowPressRelease.cfm?Subject
ID=3&RecNum=8076.
26 Bjerregaard, supra note 18, at 43; Kim Strosnider, Anti-Gang Ordinances
after City of Chicago v. Morales: The Intersection of Race, Vagueness Doc-
trine, and Equal Protection in the Criminal Law, 39 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 101,
105 (2002).
27 Klein, supra note 20, at 516.
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tween sixteen and twenty-one; (6) higher concentrations in ur-
ban environments; and (7) an orientation toward criminal
activity.28
These traits paint a picture of gangs as groups of young men
of color in poor urban neighborhoods. Although this stereo-
type-poor, minority youth in the inner city-is closer to the
meaning of a street gang than judges and lawyers understand, it
still falls short of the reality of who joins gangs. According to
some estimates, the majority of gang members in the country
are actually white,29 yet there exists a "refusal of some law en-
forcement agencies to label white groups as gangs, even when
they meet all of the elements of a particular jurisdiction's defini-
tion of a gang." 30 For example, the National Youth Gang Ser-
vice does not include certain predominantly white gangs within
its definition-motorcycle gangs and hate groups.31 This means
that the criminal street gang-the enemy that many lawmakers
and law enforcement are attempting to bring down-is misun-
derstood, despite the fact that "gang members" are prosecuted
every day across the country.32
This tangled definitional landscape has two notable effects.
First, white youth gang members tend to evade criminalization. 33
Second, "the amorphous concept of the 'gang' invites discretion-
28 Id. at 516-17.
29 While law enforcement only report that eight percent of youth (between
twelve to twenty-four year-olds) gang members are white, studies (of twelve
to sixteen year-olds) actually suggest they account for forty-two percent of
young gang members. For nonwhites, law enforcement report that Latinos
account for forty-nine percent and blacks make up thirty-seven percent of
youth gangs. In actuality, Latinos make up only twenty-four percent while
blacks represent twenty-seven percent. This means that law enforcement are
targeting nonwhites fifteen times more often than whites. Greene & Pranis,
supra note 2, at 36-38.
30 Sara Lynn Van Hofwegen, Note, Unjust and Ineffective: A Critical Look at
California's STEP Act, 18 S. CAL. INTERDIS. L.J. 679, 684 (2009).
31 Id.
32 Gary Stewart, Black Codes and Broken Windows: The Legacy of Racial
Hegemony in Anti-Gang Civil Injunctions, 107 YALE L.J. 2249, 2273 (1998).
33 Greene & Pranis, supra note 2, at 4.
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ary actions that oppress innocent minority youth. 3 4 These
young people might be considered gang members if they simply
live in certain areas or hang out with gang members.35 This is
especially true for "wannabes"-those individuals who are not
members of gangs but who associate with members and might
even hope to join one day.36 When these young people get to
court, they face the misperception that they are part of complex
criminal enterprises, which results in severe punishments.37
These individuals prosecuted in part for their gang member-
ship are overwhelmingly African-American and Latino. "Young
men of color are disproportionately identified as gang members
and targeted for surveillance, arrest and incarceration" by law
enforcement, "while whites-who make up a significant share of
gang members-rarely show up in accounts of gang enforce-
ment efforts." 38 In light of the current state of the American
criminal justice system, it is unsurprising that gang members are
categorically assumed to be poor people of color. After all,
[c]riminal suspects and defendants are much more
likely ... to be poor and black-two classes that
are often thought to do badly in the political
arena. And in a world where police and prosecu-
tors have enforcement discretion, criminal sus-
pects are defined by the willingness of public
officials (police or prosecutors) to impose heavy
costs on them.39
34 Stewart, supra note 32, at 2264.
35 Bjerregaard, supra note 18, at 44.
36 Stewart, supra note 32, at 2275.
37 See, e.g., 720 ILL. COMP STAT. 5/24-1.8 (2011).
38 Greene & Pranis, supra note 2, at 6. See also Beth Caldwell, Criminaliz-
ing Day-to-Day Life: A Socio-Legal Critique of Gang Injunctions, 37 AM. J.
CRIM. L. 241, 275 (2010) (arguing that "[g]ang injunctions are utilized almost
exclusively against Black and Latino residents in low-income communities,
and they are primarily applied to youth").
39 Stewart, supra note 32, at 2257, quoting William Stunz, Substance, Process,
and the Civil-Criminal Line, 7 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 1, 20-21 (1996).
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Because anti-gang laws target poor, minority youth in urban
communities, these disadvantaged children, and not their white
counterparts, are suffering under the laws. 40 This application of
the law not only misinterprets the problem it seeks to remedy,
but it also causes more hardship in the most vulnerable popula-
tions.41 Therefore, in discussing the problems of criminalizing
gang membership, it is appropriate to limit the analysis to those
who are disproportionately affected by these laws: poor young
men of color in urban communities.
B. Why do gangs exist?
The forces that have given rise to and cultivated gang activity
inform why anti-gang laws must be eradicated. Historically,
people of color joined gangs to escape the racist, violent society
that disenfranchised them. Today, young men of color who join
gangs are typically searching for something: the upward mobility
they have been denied, the security they have gone without.
Taken together, these forces illustrate why joining a gang often
seems like the only solution to escaping hardship.
While the history of American gangs is somewhat ambiguous,
what scholars do know provides context for why certain gangs
exist today.42 Although gangs have existed for centuries, it was
not until the 1940s that black gangs began to form. 43 Because
"racism and prejudice [were] the order of the day," young black
men joined together to protect one another and create a place
for themselves in society.44 Despite these intentions, black com-
munities faced social upheaval and youth endured "a 'process of
40 See Greene & Pranis, supra note 2, at 6.
41 Stewart, supra note 32, at 2257, quoting Stunz, supra note 39, at 20-21.
42 H. Mitchell Caldwell & Daryl Fisher-Ogden, Stalking the Jets and the
Sharks: Exploring the Constitutionality of the Gang Death Penalty Enhancer,
12 GEO. MASON L. REV. 601, 614 (2004).
43 Id. at 616-18.
44 BASTARDS OF THE PARTY (HBO 2005).
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destructive socialization"' at the hands of whites.45 For many
poor, young men of color-especially black young men-they
had few options: prison or death.46
For decades, black gangs swayed between violence and politi-
cal activism, forming organizations such as the Black Panther
Party. This mobilization was not just for protection, but also for
the right to have their voices heard47and to take back the politi-
cal power they had been denied. Gangs were a means of achiev-
ing this goal.
Eventually, however, the face of the enemy changed. Gangs
stopped fighting their white oppressors and started fighting one
another. With the arrival of the 1970s and the escalation of
white flight, "'extreme ghettoization ultimately cut off black
youth from white areas of the city so that black youth gangs
began to prey on each other"' instead of their white counter-
parts.48 Former Bloods member Cle Sloan points out that even
though many people choose to join gangs today, gangs are
rooted in a racist, slave history that gave rise to the need to fight
off white violence. 49
Thus, the history behind gang formation, especially for black
gangs, cannot be ignored in discussing the fairness of criminaliz-
ing gang members. When supporters of anti-gang laws speak
about the "choice" to join gangs, it is imperative to acknowledge
these historic forces that compelled gang formation as a way of
dealing with extreme racism and social isolation, rather than
simply choosing to engage in criminal activity.
Today, a host of reasons push many young men of color to-
ward gang life. The most significant risk factor is socioeconomic
45 Caldwell & Fisher-Ogden, supra note 42, at 618.
46 BASTARDS OF THE PARTY (HBO 2005).
47 Id.
48 Caldwell & Fisher-Ogden, supra note 42, at 618.
49 BASTARDS OF THE PARTY (HBO 2005).
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status,50 which often manifests in the form of almost complete
joblessness.51 As sociologist Sudhir Venkatesh discovered dur-
ing the seven years he spent studying gang life in the Robert
Taylor Homes housing project in Chicago, if people do not join
gangs to obtain some sort of economic security, they often have
to "hustle" to make money.52 In his interviews with some of
Robert Taylor's hustlers, Venkatesh reports:
[H]ustling jobs for men were in manual labor: you
could earn five hundred dollars a month fixing
cars in a parking lot or roughly three hundred dol-
lars a month cleaning up at the local schools. The
worst-paying jobs, meanwhile, often required the
longest hours: gathering up scrap metal or alumi-
num (a hundred dollars a month) or selling stolen
cigarettes (about seventy-five dollars a month).
While just about every hustler I interviewed told
me that he was hoping for a legit job and a better
life, I rarely saw anyone get out of the hustling
racket unless he died or went to jail.53
Thus, in a poor community such as Robert Taylor, the choices
are grim. On the one hand, the choice to join a gang means
more money and the opportunity for upward mobility. For ex-
ample, as Venkatesh learned from a Black Kings leader, J.T.,
selling drugs in certain neighborhoods provided "easy money"
and there were opportunities to move up in the ranks.54 As one
of the mid-level leaders, J.T. could have been making between
$30,000 and $75,000 or more annually at any given time. 55 Al-
50 Caldwell & Fisher-Ogden, supra note 42, at 622-23 ("historic motivations
for gang membership are beginning to give way to a desire for monetary
gain").
51 Id. at 619.
52 SUDHIR ALLADI VENKATESH, GANG LEADER FOR A DAY: A ROGUE
SOCIOLOGIST TAKES TO THE STREETS 59 (Penguin Press 2008).
53 Id. at 199.
54 Id. at 34-35.
55 Id. at 34.
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though most gang members never reach this income level, the
decision to spend time with well-earning gang members, as op-
posed to fighting for a couple hundred bucks a month as a hus-
tler, becomes incredibly tempting. This is especially true for
someone who has struggled his entire life to survive. Many in
this position might claim that this is really no choice at all, but a
matter of survival.
The problem, of course, is that gang affiliation often comes
with violence and imprisonment.5 6 But the alternative paths are
no less frightening-poverty in a poor Chicago community like
Robert Taylor can leave families without the ability to purchase
enough food, buy a winter coat or repair a front door.57 When
the cold Chicago winds enter one's living room, one's path be-
comes less about "choice" and more about survival.
A variety of other factors also contribute to gang member-
ship. Youth not only face joblessness, but they also experience
"family disorganization and lack of parental figures in the
home."58 Specifically, the environment in which these young
people are socialized carries many risk factors: presence of
drugs and guns, homes broken by parental separation and drug
use, decreased educational drive, low self-esteem and, perhaps
most importantly, "inconsistency of policing practices" that
"create[s] 'an atmosphere of danger on the streets."59 These
risks are underscored by a lack of role models to help youth
avoid the pitfalls of gang life and, consequently, many turn to
gangs to fill this void.60
These motivations for joining gangs reveal that when support-
ers of gang criminalization claim that "[g]angs fill the daily lives
of many of our poorest and most vulnerable citizens with...
terror," they fail to take into account the ways in which gang
56 BASTARDS OF THE PARTY (HBO 2005).
57 VENKATESH, supra note 52, at 150-53, 181.
58 Caldwell & Fisher-Ogden, supra note 42, at 619.
59 Id. at 622-23.
60 Stewart, supra note 32, at 2274.
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members themselves are victims of poverty, starvation and a
lack of social support. 61 In the face of these hardships, however,
lawmakers continue to implement anti-gang laws that exacer-
bate these problems.
C. How are gangs criminalized?
In an attempt to reduce gang violence and criminal activity,
many states have instituted anti-gang laws.62 They include "in-
creased sentences and penalties for gang activity, injunctions
preventing gang members from associating with each other in
particular locations and the criminalization of gang
participation."63
Criminal law statutes are one of the primary tools used to
criminalize gang affiliation. After determining that existing
criminal laws are insufficient, leaders have instituted "new gang-
related crimes" for everything from drugs to guns.64 Many of
these laws impose enhancements on sentences for gang mem-
bers who engage in this type of already-illegal activity.65 For ex-
ample, the Illinois Unlawful Possession of a Firearm By a Street
Gang member ("UUW by a street gang member") law makes it
a crime for a street gang member to unlawfully carry a firearm
and firearm ammunition outside of his home.66 This ups the
ante from the existing unlawful use of a weapon law: it increases
the crime from a misdemeanor to a felony, extends the possible
prison term from under one year to between three and ten years
and takes away the possibility of probation.67
61 City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 99 (1999).
62 Bjerregaard, supra note 18, at 32.
63 Van Hofwegen, supra note 30, at 680.
64 Strosnider, supra note 26, at 106.
65 Bjerregaard, supra note 18, at 32.
66 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/24-1.8 (2011); University of Illinois Law Student
Column, Illinois Law Update, 98 Ill. B.J. 400, 401 (2010).
67 See Illinois Law Update, 98 Ill. B.J. at 401; 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/24-1
(2010).
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Similar to criminal statutes, municipal ordinances are another
way that lawmakers criminalize gang members. Ordinances are
simply legislation passed by municipal, rather than state or fed-
eral governments. 68 The seminal case of Chicago v. Morales
dealt with a city ordinance that empowered law enforcement to
issue dispersal orders for individuals who were believed to be
gang members.69 As discussed further below, this ordinance was
struck down as unconstitutional, although during its application
it resulted in the arrest of 42,000 people.70
Civil injunctions are another method for criminalizing gangs.
They are civil orders of the court that prohibit activity in certain
areas.71 Injunctions sometimes render legal activities illegal for
gang members, and other times they further punish existing ille-
gal activity, similar to the UUW by a street gang member law.72
In some states, such as California, when an individual is labeled
a gang member and issued an injunction, he is entered into a
database and can later "receive a sentence enhancement on top
of the prescribed prison sentence-for low-level felonies, an ex-
tra two to four years; and for violent felonies, an extra ten
years."73
These efforts bear a striking similarity to the historic, uncon-
stitutional vagrancy laws used to keep former slaves in a state of
quasi slavery by restricting how and where blacks could move.74
Just as disadvantaged people of color were labeled as "vagrants"
in order to marginalize them under the guise of criminal behav-
ior, anti-gang laws that prevent young men of color from engag-
ing in certain legal activity or more severely criminalize them for
68 BALLENTINE'S LAW DICTIONARY (2010).
69 Morales, 527 U.S. at 46-47.
70 Id. at 49.
71 BALLENTINE'S LAW DICTIONARY (2010); Hofwegen, supra note 30, at 680.
72 Myers, supra note 6, at 286-87.
73 Id. at 291.
74 Morales, 527 U.S. at 54; Stewart, supra note 32, at 2258.
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illegal acts likewise marginalizes disadvantaged people, but
under the guise of gang membership.75
Overall, the common thread of these anti-gang laws is their
focus on increasing punishment for anyone who affiliates with a
gang. But these massive deployments of police power against
gang members fail to make the streets safer and actually cause
more harm than good to the communities they purport to help.76
D. The ineffectiveness of anti-gang laws
Evidence shows that police suppression tactics authorized by
anti-gang laws "can increase gang cohesion and police-commu-
nity tensions, and [most strikingly,] they have a poor track re-
cord when it comes to reducing crime and violence." 77 When
these tactics are implemented, the incidence of violence in a
community might remain unchanged, others times it temporarily
decreases and then relocates to a nearby community and, some-
times, the violence actually increases.78
A response to this data might be that incapacitating gang
members-taking them off the streets-inherently prevents
them from engaging in gang activity. However, evidence shows
that imprisonment actually reduces the likelihood that members
will "age out" and leave gangs, 79 and is likely to strengthen one's
gang ties in order to survive incarceration.8°
75 Vagrancy laws' striking similarity to anti-gang laws, especially injunctions,
lies in the "methods of control and banishment of unwanted people who
threatened 'financial burden, nuisance and potential criminality."' Stewart,
supra note 32, at 2258, quoting Caleb Foote, 104 U. PA. L. REV. 603 (1956).
76 See Stewart, supra note 32, at 2255-56, citing David Cole, The Paradox of
Race and Crime: A Comment on Randall Kennedy's "Politics of Distinction,"
83 GEO. L.J. 2547, 2555 (1995).
77 Greene & Pranis, supra note 2, at 5.
78 Myers, supra note 6, at 296-97 ("while some members continue to commit
crimes in the target area after an injunction has been imposed against them,
others simply relocate to adjoining areas to commit crimes").
79 Greene & Pranis, supra note 2, at 4-5.
80 Hofwegen, supra note 30, at 690.
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Moreover, these suppression tactics worsen conditions in the
neighborhoods they purport to save from gang violence:
By removing so many black men from the commu-
nity and stigmatizing them forever with a criminal
conviction, criminal law enforcement is likely to
mean more single-parent families, less adult super-
vision of children, more unemployed and unem-
ployable members of the community, more
poverty, and in turn, more drugs, more crime and
more violence. This is not to minimize the burden
that criminals themselves present to the commu-
nity. It is simply to suggest that incarceration-
especially on such a massive scale in a well-de-
fined community-is far from an adequate solu-
tion, and may well exacerbate the problems
associated with crack and crime.81
Not only are these laws ineffective, but they also exaggerate
the role of gangs in the country's illegal activity. In actuality,
gangs do not primarily control the drug trade, and gang-related
crime is actually a smaller percentage of overall crime in most
areas.8 2 In fact, without law enforcement intervention, "[m]ost
gang members join when they are young and quickly outgrow
their gang affiliation."83 Because leaving a gang "reduces the
risk of negative life outcomes," these anti-gang laws actually
contribute to the gang problem rather than remedy it.84
The faces of gang members come from a range of racial back-
grounds-white, black and brown. However, in courthouses
across the country, the faces of prosecuted gang members are
almost entirely black and brown. Under many of these anti-
gangs laws, these individuals are supposed to endure harsher
punishment for certain conduct because they belong to gangs.
81 Stewart, supra note 32, at 2255-56, citing Cole, supra note 76, at 2555.
82 Greene & Pranis, supra note 2, at 4.
83 Id.
84 Id. at 5.
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In reality, they receive harsher treatment in the criminal justice
system because of skin color, socioeconomic status and the per-
vasive confusion that exists among judicial officers, law enforce-
ment, and the public as to how the U.S. should address gang
problems. Therefore, because of the criminal justice system's
continual failure to proportionately and effectively address
gangs, an entirely new discourse is necessary.
IH. TRADITIONAL CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGES:
VAGUENESS AND OVERBREADTH DOCTRINES
Opponents of anti-gang legislation primarily use two constitu-
tional approaches to challenge these laws: vagueness and over-
breadth doctrines. 85 However, appellate courts have historically
upheld anti-gang laws in the face of these constitutional chal-
lenges. 86 Before proposing a new method of challenging these
laws, this critique will first examine why these traditional doc-
trines fail to eradicate anti-gang laws.
A. Vagueness
A common, yet ineffective avenue for challenging anti-gang
laws is the vagueness doctrine. The vagueness doctrine states
that a law is unconstitutional if it fails one of two prongs: (1) the
law does not give citizens notice of what types of conduct are
illegal; or (2) the law authorizes "arbitrary and discriminatory
enforcement" by the police.87 Interpretations of the vagueness
doctrine, however, have prevented successful challenges to anti-
85 Although there are challenges that might not be categorized strictly as
vagueness or overbreadth, these other approaches are related and produce
similar challenges as those discussed below. See, e.g., Caldwell, supra note
38, at 271 (discussing the "effectiveness of means" approach, which analyzes
whether the means used to eradicate the problem are effective enough under
due process restrictions).
86 Bjerregaard, supra note 18, at 46.
87 Morales, 527 U.S. at 56.
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gang laws. First, in order to challenge an anti-gang law for
vagueness, one must show that it violates a specific liberty pro-
tected by the Due Process Clause of the 5th or 14th Amend-
ments, such as the freedom of movement or travel.88 Although
some anti-gang laws might reach protected liberties, such as by
restricting a gang member's right to walk on the street, the U.S.
Supreme Court has not found that belonging to a gang itself is a
constitutionally protected liberty.89 Second, the vagueness doc-
trine enables legislators to enact anti-gang laws as long as they
do not contain defects pertaining to the notice or arbitrary en-
forcement prongs. This invites legislatures to craft laws specifi-
cally to avoid vagueness challenges. The Morales case illustrates
these shortcomings of the vagueness doctrine.
In City of Chicago v. Morales, the U.S. Supreme Court used
the vagueness doctrine to strike down a Chicago ordinance that
empowered law enforcement to issue dispersal orders to gang
members.90 The Court held that the ordinance first failed to
provide sufficient notice because what amounted to "loitering"
was unclear.91 Secondly, the Court found that the ordinance
gave police too much discretion in determining when someone
was loitering. 92
Notably, the Court gave several ways in which the ordinance
could have avoided a successful constitutional challenge. For
example, the law could have contained a mens rea requirement
or limited the populations targeted by the ordinance. 93 The ef-
fect of the Morales opinion was essentially to affirm the consti-
tutionality of similar ordinances as long as tweaks like these are
made. In her concurring opinion, Justice O'Connor confirmed
that these types of ordinances would be upheld if lawmakers fix
88 Id. at 53, 102.
89 Stewart, supra note 32, at 2276.
90 Morales, 527 U.S. at 51.
91 Id. at 57.
92 Id. at 61.
93 Id. at 60, 62.
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the defects: "[T]here remain open to Chicago reasonable alter-
natives to combat the very real threat posed by gang intimida-
tion and violence. For example .. . [Chicago could establish]
laws that target only gang members."94 Although the Court
struck down the ordinance under the vagueness doctrine, Justice
O'Connor expressed no reservations with criminalizing gang
membership. The vagueness doctrine, therefore, is an ineffec-
tive approach for opponents of anti-gang laws to achieve
eradication.
B. Overbreadth
The overbreadth doctrine represents another traditional, yet
ineffective, avenue for challenging the constitutionality of anti-
gang laws. Similar to the due process protections under the
vagueness doctrine, overbreadth requires a showing that the law
regulates protected activity under the First Amendment. 95
Again, opponents cannot successfully challenge a law for over-
breadth because gang membership alone is not a constitution-
ally protected category of First Amendment conduct. 96
Even if courts were to officially recognize gang activities as
protected speech or association, lawmakers could easily evade
constitutional challenges. For example, if the U.S. Supreme
Court determined that a gang member is constitutionally pro-
tected when he speaks about being in a gang or meets up with
fellow gang members, First Amendment protections would only
protect those activities. The moment this gang member engages
in some act having nothing to do with the scope of First Amend-
ment protections, he is no longer protected from laws that
heighten his punishment for being part of a gang.97
94 Id. at 67 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (citations omitted).
95 Stewart, supra note 32, at 2276.
96 Id. (discussing how according to the Supreme Court, "affiliations between
gang members do not merit any recognizable First Amendment protection").
97 See United States v. Choate, 576 F.2d 165, 181 (9th Cir. 1978).
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A common shortcoming of both the vagueness and over-
breadth doctrines is that constitutional challenges are rooted in
a showing of explicitly protected conduct. Like all traditional
approaches, these doctrines focus on the ways laws infringe
upon a person's conduct rather than his identity.98 Even if a
gang member were to engage in a constitutionally protected ac-
tivity, the protection from harsher punishment dissolves the mo-
ment he stops this activity. If one day he engages in his freedom
to attend a gang meeting, his protections end when he leaves the
meeting and returns home that night. He is still a gang member.
When he wakes in the morning, he is still a gang member. If he
goes to school, he is still a gang member. Gang membership is
what a person is, not what he does. And most importantly, what
gang members do is often already deemed criminal-these laws
simply impose greater consequences because of who they are.
This is why a new constitutional platform is necessary-one that
reflects the sociological reality that gang membership should not
be a basis for harsher punishment because it is a guise for one's
disenfranchised social status.
IV. THE STATUS DOCTRINE & GANG MEMBERSHIP
A. The "status" doctrine
The Eighth Amendment ban on cruel and unusual punish-
ment has historically proscribed certain types of punishments. 99
For example, courts typically use the Cruel and Unusual Punish-
ment Clause to find that the death penalty would be an unjust
sentence in certain cases.1°° The Supreme Court expanded this
constitutional protection in the 1962 Robinson v. Californial0
decision to "impose[ ] substantive limits on what can be made
98 Stewart, supra note 32, at 2276.
99 Note, The Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause and the Substantive
Criminal Law, 79 HARV. L. REV. 635, 636-37 (1966).
100 See id. at 638.
101 33 U.S. 660 (1962).
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criminal."102 The Court held that individuals may not be pun-
ished based on their status.10 3 In other words, certain criminal
laws amount to cruel and unusual punishment. This is known as
the status doctrine.
The law struck down in Robinson criminalized being addicted
to narcotics.104 This law was impermissible because it punished
an individual not for illegally using or buying drugs, but simply
for being an addict.10 5 The Court found that this law punished
people based on status-an addiction, which it likened to an ill-
ness.10 6 Such criminalization amounted to cruel and unusual
punishment.107
The reasoning underlying the Robinson opinion was unclear,
as reflected in subsequent confusion among lower courts' inter-
pretations.108 Despite this lack of clarity, however, a central
principle emerged from this landmark decision: "[T]here are in-
stances in which the state, despite its legitimate interest in sup-
pressing and correcting a socially harmful condition, may not
without violating standards of decency impose criminal sanc-
tions."109 Before turning to the utility of the status doctrine in
eradicating anti-gang laws, an examination of the tangled case
law surrounding the status doctrine is warranted.
B. The incoherent landscape of "status" case law
The landscape of Eighth Amendment status doctrine is messy,
unclear and incomplete. 1 0 This critique argues for the need for
102 Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 667 (1977).
103 Robinson, 370 U.S. at 666.
104 Id.
105 Id.
106 Id. at 666-67.
107 Id.
108 Note, supra note 99, at 655.
109 Id.
110 See, e.g., Anderson v. City of Portland, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 67519 (D.
Or. July 31, 2009) (noting how, in the context of homelessness, "[clourts have
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new precedent rather than relying on the incoherent decisions
discussed below."'
Following Robinson, only one other U.S. Supreme Court case
has squarely addressed the status doctrine in 1968: Powell v.
Texas.112 However, Powell provided little insight into the rea-
soning underlying Robinson. The Powell plurality upheld a
Texas law that made public drunkenness a crime. 113 In finding
that Robinson did not apply, the plurality found that the defen-
dant "was convicted, not for being a chronic alcoholic, but for
being in public while drunk on a particular occasion. The State
of Texas had thus not sought to punish a mere status, as Califor-
nia did in Robinson." 14 The Texas law treated all violators of
the law-alcoholics and non-alcoholics-the same. However, in
its analysis, the plurality implied that a law punishing alcoholism
would be constitutionally impermissible.
The Powell plurality further explained,
The entire thrust of Robinson's interpretation of
the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause is that
criminal penalties may be inflicted only if the ac-
cused has committed some act, has engaged in
some behavior, which society has an interest in
preventing, or perhaps in historical common law
terms, has committed some actus reus. It thus
does not deal with the question of whether certain
conduct cannot constitutionally be punished be-
reached differing conclusions in deciding whether the Eighth Amendment
protects" such individuals from punishment).
111 Although some of the case law discussed in this section is non-binding
and the opinions come from a range of courts, they are only intended to be
illustrative of the chaotic nature of the Eighth Amendment status
jurisprudence.
112 392 U.S. 514 (1968).
113 Id. at 532.
114 Id.
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cause it is, in some sense, "involuntary" or "occa-
sioned by a compulsion."'115
While this analysis shows that a law should contain an actus
reus element for it to be constitutionally sound, it does not clar-
ify whether a law may punish unlawful conduct in addition to
status. This is the case with the UUW by a street gang member
law-it has elements of both illegally possessing a firearm and
being a gang member.116 Therefore, it presents a crime with
both actus reus and status elements.
To understand how this type of law should be interpreted
under the Robinson-Powell status doctrine, courts should return
to the foundational principle that it is cruel and unusual to pun-
ish someone for his or her status-for who he or she is.117 Con-
sequently, it should be impermissible to enact a law like the
UUW by a street gang member statute, which punishes some-
one for illegal conduct while imposing an additional punishment
based on status. As an illustration, if a public drunkenness
crime existed like that in Powell, it would be unconstitutional to
enact another, more serious crime of public drunkenness plus
being an alcoholic." 8 This latter crime has the same effect as a
separate law that only punishes alcoholism, which would pre-
sumably be unconstitutional under the Robinson-Powell
precedent.
Despite the strained conclusions scholars can draw from
Robinson and Powell, these decisions are too limited to truly
understand the scope of the status doctrine. Not only are they
outdated, but they also dealt with physiological status without
accounting for sociological or societal status. An examination of
subsequent case law only adds confusion to whether the status
115 Id. at 533.
116 720 ILL. COMP STAT. 5/24-1.8 (2011).
117 The Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause and the Substantive Criminal
Law, supra note 99, at 655.
118 Powell, 392 U.S. at 532.
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doctrine applies to sociological types of status, demonstrating
why a new understanding of this doctrine is necessary.
In attempting to determine (1) what amounts to a status and
(2) whether a law impermissibly punishes individuals based on
status, courts have relied on a variety of overlapping and at
times contradictory interpretations of Robinson.
For example, many courts look to the voluntariness of a con-
dition to determine if it constitutes a status. In some cases, a
status only exists if it is entirely involuntary when an individual
contracts it.119 Other opinions have found that when a condition
is "only 'rarely' a choice," it amounts to a status.120 In Pottinger
v. Miami, a Florida district court found that homelessness was a
status because "people rarely choose to be homeless. Rather,
homelessness is due to various economic, physical or psychologi-
cal factors that are beyond the homeless individual's control."121
Other courts have described this voluntariness factor as the "de-
gree to which an individual has control over the characteris-
tic."122 Overall, these invocations of the voluntariness approach
essentially reflect one consistent principle: those who unknow-
ingly contracted a condition should not be punished for it.123
When courts focus solely on whether a person involuntarily
contracted his condition, however, they go beyond the reasoning
laid out in Robinson.124 The opinion did not go so far as to say
that voluntariness was the sole or determining factor in ascer-
taining status. Rather, it stated that addiction "is apparently an
illness which may be contracted innocently or involuntarily."1 25
Moreover, this voluntariness approach risks taking away status
protections for most of the narcotics addicts who would have
119 Tobe v. City of Santa Ana, 892 P.2d 1145, 1166 (Cal. 1995).
120 Pottinger v. Miami, 810 F. Supp. 1551, 1563 (S.D. Fla. 1992), quoted in
Joyce v. City & Co. of San Francisco, 846 F. Supp. 843, 856 (N.D. Cal. 1994).
121 Pottinger, 810 F. Supp. at 1563.
122 Joyce, 846 F. Supp. at 857.
123 Note, supra note 99, at 654-55.
124 Id. at 649.
125 Robinson, 370 U.S. at 667 (emphasis added).
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been punished under the California law because, in actuality,
most addicts do not develop addictions involuntarily.12 6 Robin-
son would thus only have applied to those who were born or
somehow forced into addiction, yet the Court made no such
qualification in its holding.12 7 Therefore, the importance of vol-
untariness is unclear in this analysis, despite the variety of ways
in which lower courts have attempted to use it in determining
what amounts to a status.
Other opinions have expanded status to specific categories.
For example, while some courts have found that homelessness is
a status, 128 others have found just the opposite. 129 Some courts
have limited status to traits such as national origin, gender, age
or illness, many of which are present at birth.130 Others have
not made such specific findings.13'
Existing case law is even more confusing in terms of the sec-
ond issue: whether laws have the effect of punishing based on
status. Some have found that laws are unconstitutional if sta-
tus-rather than conduct-is the determining factor,132 whereas
others have taken the more extreme position that only a total
absence of an actus reus element renders a law unconstitu-
tional.133 For those laws that contain a conduct or actus reus
component, some courts have placed significance on the nature
of the underlying conduct itself. For example, some courts have
taken the position that conduct derivative of one's status must
126 See Robinson, 370 U.S. at 665; The Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause
and the Substantive Criminal Law, supra note 99, at 649.
127 See Robinson, 370 U.S. at 667-68.
128 Pottinger, 810 F. Supp. at 1563.
129 Tobe, 9 Cal. 4th at 1106.
130 Joyce, 846 F. Supp. at 857.
131 See, e.g., Tobe, 892 P.2d at 1167.
132 Farber v. Rochford, 407 F. Supp. 529, 533 (N.D. Il1. 1975); Youkhana, 277
I11. App. 3d at 113. See also Doe v. City of Lafayette, 377 F.2d 757 (7th Cir.
2004) (J. Williams, dissenting).
133 Tobe, 892 P.2d at 1166; Joyce, 846 F. Supp. at 857.
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be innocent to be protected. 34 Other opinions do not address
the nature of the criminalized conduct at all.135
A common theme among these cases, however, is that there is
typically some underlying problem that lawmakers are attempt-
ing to remedy, such as drug addiction or homelessness. 136 The
governmental interest stems from preventing certain conduct re-
lated to the status, such as homeless individuals sleeping outside
and consequently blocking public ways.137 Yet beyond this
thread, there is little continuity in the case law interpreting the
status doctrine.
Despite the valuable principles underlying the status doctrine,
"Robinson raises many more questions than it answers."'138
Thus, scholars are left to interpret the status doctrine without
the aid of clear interpretive decisions. Yet one foundational
principle should guide one's invocation of the status doctrine: it
is cruel and unusual to punish people for who they are. 139
C. Gang membership should be deemed a "status"
Due to the incomplete doctrinal picture of what constitutes a
status and the outdated nature of the case law, a new approach
to understanding this doctrine is necessary. The question this
analysis seeks to answer is, for what should an individual be held
legally responsible? 140 A more basic examination of what status
134 Pottinger, 810 F. Supp. at 1561-65.
135 See, e.g., United States v. Black, 116 F.3d 198, 201 (7th Cir. 1997) (noting
that the defendant was not unconstitutionally punished because he could not
show that his unlawful conduct of having child pornography "was involuntary
or uncontrollable").
136 See Robinson, 370 U.S. at 667 (noting the "vicious evils of the narcotics
traffic [that] have occasioned the grave concern of government").
137 See Anderson, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS at 19.
138 The Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause and the Substantive Criminal
Law, supra note 99, at 655.
139 See generally, id. (stating that when courts attempt to discern the mean-
ing of Robinson, they should return to its underlying principle of decency).
140 See Powell, 392 U.S. at 533-34.
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is in today's society, in conjunction with the sociological realities
of gang life, will provide an answer: an individual should not be
criminally responsible solely for his gang membership.
To begin with, the plain meaning of the word "status" is in-
formative. "Status" is defined as "the relative social, profes-
sional, or other standing of someone or something. '"141 The role
of social status is relevant to determining how this doctrine
should be applied in the future. Combining this social under-
standing of status with the central tenet of Robinson that people
should not be unfairly punished for who they are-their stand-
ing in life-this doctrine is plainly applicable to gang
membership.
As described in the beginning of this analysis, individuals who
are prosecuted under anti-gang legislation almost invariably face
dismal socioeconomic conditions. Plagued by poverty and few
opportunities for legitimate income, many young men in low-
income neighborhoods join gangs.142 Gang membership might
be a way to achieve upward mobility instead of a life of hustling
for little money or searching for low-level "legitimate" employ-
ment, often to no avail.143 Thus, joining a gang is often indica-
tive of one's social status. Under the language of Robinson,
being born in a poverty-infested neighborhood is much like an
illness: generations upon generations of people have been op-
pressed by the more affluent majority, leaving few opportunities
to escape their culture of poverty.1" Just as a narcotics addict
may have been exposed to drugs as a small child and subse-
quently become addicted, a young person in a poor neighbor-
hood might get a taste of a more affluent, protected life with a
gang and suddenly find himself unable to return to a life of so-
141 Online Oxford Dictionary, available at http://oxforddictionaries.com/
definition/status?region=us (last visited Apr. 2, 2012).
142 Stewart, supra note 32, at 2255-56, quoting Cole, supra note 76, at 2555.
143 VENKATESH, supra note 52, at 150-53, 181.
144 Stewart, supra note 32, at 2255-56, quoting Cole, supra note 76, at 2547,
2558; VENKATESH, supra note 52, at 150-53, 182-83.
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cial isolation, poverty and disappointment.145 Even though the
decision to join a gang is not always about survival, the history
of street gangs is rooted in the need to survive and the opportu-
nity to thrive.146 A young man who faces these conditions at
birth is therefore dealt a lower social standing than his privi-
leged, white peers. Punishing him more harshly for this, as law
enforcement and prosecutors do, violates the central principle of
decency that Robinson established.147
Expanding the status doctrine to gang membership is not sim-
ply an attempt to absolve gang members of responsibility for
unlawful conduct. Rather, gang members would still be held re-
sponsible just as non-gang members when, for example, they un-
lawfully carry a weapon. In applying this proposition to all anti-
gang legislation, states should have to rely on existing penal
codes rather than creating new classes of crimes that more se-
verely punish gang members. Lawmakers should not be permit-
ted to find back-door ways to criminalize gang membership by
tacking it on to existing crimes and heightening the stakes. Not
only are these new classes of crimes ineffective, but they are also
rooted in misguided notions about gang problems in America.148
Even if one agrees that existing case law is misguided and
gang membership should be deemed a status, critics might still
contend that anti-gang laws are permissible because they punish
illegal conduct rather than mere status. For example, one might
contend that the UUW by a street gang member law punishes
illegal conduct-the possession of a weapon. 49 This position re-
145 BASTARDS OF THE PARTY (HBO 2005); VENKATESH, supra note 52, at
150-53, 181.
146 BASTARDS OF THE PARTY (HBO 2005).
147 See Note, supra note 99, at 655.
148 See supra Part II.A, notes 18-38 and accompanying text.
149 Transcript of Motion Argument at 11, People v. Vicente Navarrete, No. 10
CR 11085 (11. Cir. Cook Co. Ct. June 30, 2011) (during oral argument on a
constitutionality motion of the UUW by a street gang member law, the pros-
ecutor emphasized that this law did not punish status because it made con-
duct illegal).
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flects a belief that it is only unconstitutional to punish "pure sta-
tus," a condition absent any conduct by the individual. 50 The
"pure status" viewpoint finds support in one of the many post-
Robinson decisions that attempted to interpret the status doc-
trine. In Farber v. Rochford, the Northern District of Illinois
found that "[t]here [was] no actus reus at all required by the
ordinance, only conduct which, while occasionally an 'adjunct'
to illicit behavior, is of itself perfectly defensible."'15 This cri-
tique is still invoked today by lower Illinois courts as they reject
challenges to the UUW by a street gang member law.152 To
these critics, as long as the law punishes some action, it is
permissible.
However, the fact that an anti-gang law also contains an actus
reus element does not remove its criminalization of mere status,
as discussed above. 153 In fact, the Farber opinion discusses how
the unconstitutional law in Powell v. Texas "punished an illicit
act, public drunken behavior, rather than the status of being a
chronic alcoholic."'' 54 The Farber opinion thus emphasized the
absence of specific criminalization based on alcoholism, regard-
less of additional criminal elements contained in the law.155
Moreover, the Robinson opinion acknowledged the possibility
that a law is partly defective for punishing status when it found
that the "portion of the statute referring to 'addicted to the use'
of narcotics [was] based upon a condition or status."'156 The es-
sential constitutional flaw therefore lies in what a law does pun-
ish-status-rather than what it does not punish-conduct.
Applying this distinction to the UUW by a street gang mem-
ber law, the statute creates an entirely new crime, apart from the
150 Note, supra note 99, at 646-47.
151 Farber, 407 F. Supp. at 534.
152 Transcript of Oral Ruling on Motion Argument, People v. Vicente Navar-
rete, No. 10 CR 11085 (I11. Cir. Cook Co. Ct. July 21, 2011).
153 See supra Part IV.B, notes 112-118 and accompanying text.
154 Farber, 407 F. Supp. at 533 (emphasis added).
155 See id.
156 Robinson, 370 U.S. at 662.
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existing UUW offense, purely on the basis of status-gang
membership. A comparison to the existing UUW law is instruc-
tive. Put simply, it is already a crime to unlawfully carry a fire-
arm.157 The UUW by a gang member law creates a new crime
that elevates the class and heightens the sentencing range.1 58 In
practice, when an individual is charged with unlawfully carrying
a weapon in Illinois, on his first offense he will be brought to a
misdemeanor courtroom. 159 If he is found guilty, he faces a pos-
sible Class A Misdemeanor conviction and less than one year in
prison.16 ° By contrast, if someone is charged and convicted of
unlawful possession of a weapon by a street gang member, he
faces a Class 2 Felony for a first offense and between three and
seven years in prison.161 As civil rights advocate and scholar
Michelle Alexander discusses, having felony convictions
relegates people for their entire lives, to second-
class status .... for drug felons, there is little hope
of escape. Barred from public housing by law, dis-
criminated against by private landlords, ineligible
for food stamps, forced to "check the box" indicat-
ing a felony conviction on employment applica-
tions for nearly every job, and denied licenses for
a wide range of professions, people whose only
crime is drug addiction or possession of a small
amount of drugs for recreational use find them-
selves locked out of the mainstream society and
economy-permanently. 162
Thus, when laws such as the UUW by a street gang member
statute impose a felony conviction simply because of gang mem-
bership, the defendant suffers a much more severe punishment
157 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/24-1 (2011).
158 See 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/24-1.8 (2011).
159 See 730 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/5-4.5-55 (2009).
160 Id.
161 See id. at 5/5-4.5-35.
162 Alexander Michelle, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE
AGE OF COLORBLINDNESS 92 (The New Press 2010).
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than if he were convicted without the additional gang element.
Because of this disparity, laws criminalizing gang membership
can be categorized as "second order laws." That is, they are
"derived from existing laws but placed in 'new combinations to
create new "crimes" from the new combinations.' "163 Injunc-
tions and ordinances present similar "second order" problems.
An injunction might prohibit gang members from engaging in
conduct that is already illegal, such as illicit drug use in a partic-
ular area.164 If an individual receives a citation and is subse-
quently added to the gang database, as in California, that label
may lead to automatic sentence enhancements for later
crimes. 165 City ordinances similarly "work[ ] in tandem" with
substantive criminal laws and contribute to this second order
problem.166
These second order laws also enable prosecutors to further
abuse their charging power. 167 Prosecutors now have the choice
to tack on a gang-related charge, which provides "additional
plea-bargaining chips."'168 Criminal defendants, in turn, believe
that they should take the lower plea deals when prosecutors of-
fer to remove the gang charge.69 Because it is the prosecutor
with the power to seek additional charges, not the defense attor-
ney, the defendant is left powerless to avoid this prosecutorial
abuse.
Another critique of expanding the status doctrine might be
that it will too drastically reduce the ability of states to use their
police power in fighting gang violence. Case law supports this
163 Overton, supra note 9, at 422.
164 Myers, supra note 6, at 286-87.
165 Id. at 291.
166 Strosnider, supra note 26, at 107.
167 The prosecutor has the power to bring charges and is expected to only do
so when such a decision is supported by probable cause. MODEL RULES OF
PROF'L CONDUCr R. 3.8(g)(2)(ii) (2010).
168 Stephanos Bibas, Plea Bargaining Outside the Shadow of Trial, 117
HARV. L. Ruv. 2464, 2519 (2004).
169 Id.
Volume 5, Number 2
De~aul Journal f:or Social Justice 36+
Spring 2012
32
DePaul Journal for Social Justice, Vol. 5, Iss. 2 [2016], Art. 5
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jsj/vol5/iss2/5
15EHIND THE GUISF OF GANG MEM5ERSHIP
critique because it shows that courts invoke this doctrine spar-
ingly. 170 In other words, courts rarely use status to intervene.
To be clear, this expansion of the status doctrine would consti-
tute a more extreme constitutional stance than courts have held
in the past.171 However, in light of the extensive sociological re-
search showing that nonwhites born into urban poverty often
face few options for legitimate survival, fairness demands a shift
away from harsher punishment. Fears of under-using police
power or over-using the courts must give way to the greater
need for ending this unjust criminalization.
D. Alternatives to Criminalization
Rather than employing punitive, ineffective measures in an
attempt to shake the gang ties out of young men, lawmakers
should turn their attention to more successful, humane ap-
proaches that stay true to the central decency principle underly-
ing the status doctrine. In New York City, for example, officials
have implemented intervention tactics that have proven very ef-
fective.172 The intervention programs include job training and
employment, recreational and after-school activities and
mentoring.173 Since the implementation of these interventionist
tactics, crimes that are gang-related have declined and the city
"has made a significant dent in gang violence."' 174 Approaches
like this reveal that lawmakers should end the nationwide war
on gangs through police suppression tactics and reallocate these
resources for intervention.
170 Ingraham, 430 U.S. at 667-68.
171 Multiple courts have referenced the very limited scope of the "status"
doctrine. See, e.g., Powell, 392 U.S. at 533.
172 Myers, supra note 6, at 300-01.
173 Id.
174 Id.
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V. CONCLUSION
Many individuals find themselves on the fringes of society be-
cause of various handicaps-racial discrimination, extreme pov-
erty, violence in their community and a lack of institutions to
insulate them from illegal temptations. Today, lawmakers are
compounding the suffering of these populations by punishing
them more severely for joining gangs. As a result, the gaps are
continuing to widen between white and non-white, rich and
poor. The solution to this injustice is to do away with harsher
punishments on the basis of gang membership. But traditional
approaches are not enough. An entirely new discourse is
needed-one that takes into account the human suffering and
ineffectiveness underlying this criminalization. Until laws that
further handicap people based on status are eradicated, the
criminal justice system will continue to be the bearer of injustice
in America.
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